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I
n the past few years, the pace of consolidation
in the banking industry has accelerated, and
combinations between banks and other finan-
cial service providers have become increasingly
prevalent. In some countries, consolidation has
resulted from the need to eliminate weak or
problem institutions. More generally, however,
the unprecedented wave of merger activity in
financial services is being driven by powerful
changes in telecommunications and information
technologyandbytheremovaloflegalandregula-
tory barriers to national and international linkages.
An important recent development is a change in
the scale of financial industry mergers. Indeed,
the size of these business combinations has
increased to the point that, both in the United
States and Europe, megamergers are reshaping
the structure of the financial services industry.
Financialmegamergersraiseanumberofimpor-
tant public policy issues. Some of these issues are




tions and industry concentration.
However, the rise of banking and financial
industry conglomerates brings into sharper focus
a long-standing concern not addressed in exist-
ing merger guidelines. In a world dominated by
mega financial institutions, governments could
be reluctant to close those that become troubled
for fear of systemic effects on the financial sys-
tem.Totheextenttheseinstitutionsbecometoo
big to fail, and where uninsured depositors and
other creditors are protected by implicit govern-
ment guarantees, the consequences can be quite
serious. Indeed, the result may be a less stable
and a less efficient financial system.
In my remarks, today, I will focus on the chal-
lenges posed by financial industry megamergers
and examine some possible policy options cur-
rently under study. My discussion will begin by
briefly reviewing consolidation trends and the
rise of megamergers. I will then highlight some
of the policy issues raised by megamergers and
discuss some of the policy alternatives under
review.
Not surprisingly, there are no easy answers
to the challenges accompanying the advent of
megamergers. I am decidedly less optimistic than
some about whether we will, in the end, be able
to rely sufficiently on market discipline to correct
for potential distortions stemming from govern-
ment guarantees. I suspect we will inevitably
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that is too big to fail and, over time, relying more
heavily on regulation and prudential supervision
to oversee activities. Part of our challenge is to
outline how we might in the future deal with too
bigtofailasweattempttobalancetheeconomic
benefits of consolidation against the potential
costs to the financial system.
I. THE RISE OF MEGAMERGERS
In the United States and other industrialized
countries, consolidation in financial services is
occurring along three dimensions: within the bank-
ing industry, between banks and other financial
service providers, and across national borders. To
date, much of the consolidation has happened
within the banking industry. In the United States
we have seen the number of banking organiza-
tionsfallfromaround12,000intheearly1980sto
about7,000organizationstoday,adecreaseofover
40 percent. In European countries, where the num-
ber of banks is much smaller than in the United
States, a similar trend nevertheless is apparent.
There are also growing linkages between banks
and other financial service providers. In the United
States and Canada, there has been a trend toward
consolidation of commercial banking and invest-
ment banking operations. In Europe, where the
universal banking model is more prevalent, the
trend has been to combine banking and insurance
activities.
While much of the consolidation, thus far, has
occurred within domestic financial markets, there
are signs of increased cross-border activity as
well. In the United States, Canadian, Japanese,
and European banks have acquired a variety
of institutions. In Europe, important mergers have
occurred between financial institutions in Bel-
giumandtheNetherlands,andmorecross-border
activity is expected with the launch of the euro.
At the same time that mergers are reducing the
number of financial institutions, the size of these
combinations is increasing dramatically as com-
pared both to previous mergers in the industry
andtononfinancialmergers.Forexample,inthe
United States we have seen such combina-
tions as NationsBank/Bank of America and
Citibank/Travelers. In Canada, two proposed
mergers involving four of the top five Canadian
banks were recently denied by the government.
In Europe, we have seen megamergers in Swit-
zerland, France, Austria, Belgium, Spain, and
the Netherlands. And, Deutsche Banks acquisi-
tion of Bankers Trust will create a significant
global banking organization.
The trend toward consolidation in the finan-
cial services industry can be traced to several
factors. In the United States, one impetus was
the need to eliminate weak or problem institu-
tions during the thrift and banking crises of the
late 1980s and 1990s. Some European countries
experienced similar problems with institutions
weakened by exposure to real estate lending.
A more important factor behind the wave of
merger activity, however, is technological change
intelecommunicationsandinformationprocess-
ing, which has dramatically lowered the cost of
providing many financial services. In this environ-
ment,mergersmayallowfinancialinstitutionsto
achieve greater economies of scale made possi-
ble by the new technologies. These same forces
have also increased pressures for consolidation
by lowering costs of entry, increasing competi-
tion within the financial services industry, and
causing less efficient firms to merge.
Merger activity has also been stimulated by a
reduction in legal barriers to consolidation both
nationally and internationally. In the United
States, for example, consolidation within the
banking industry accelerated with the removal
of barriers to interstate banking. Many countries
have also relaxed existing barriers to combina-
tions of banks with other financial service pro-
viders. Finally, barriers to consolidation across
countries have also been lowered as many
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II. POLICY ISSUES RAISED BY
MEGAMERGERS
Rapid banking consolidation and the recent
creation of very large financial institutions are
beginning to raise a number of important public
policyissues.Forexample,howcanwebecertain
that these megamergers are in the public interest,
and are our traditional regulatory tools adequate




and banking agencies must consider a variety of
public policy issues before approving bank merg-
ers and acquisitions. The Federal Reserve Board,
forinstance,mustapproveacquisitionsandmergers
ofbankholdingcompanies,andeachproposalmust
satisfy several specific factors. These include the
competitive effects of the transaction, the finan-
cial and managerial resources and prospects of
the resulting organization, and the effect on the
communities to be served.
In judging competitive effects, the Board primar-
ily focuses on competition within local banking
markets or individual metropolitan areas, where
the effects are likely to be the most direct and
observable. Competition is judged by the struc-
ture of each marketmost notably the number of
banks within the market, the amount of banking
concentration both before and after the merger,
and the level of competition from nonbank sources.
One other potential constraint on large mergers is
the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking Act, which
sets a 10 percent nationwide deposit concentration
limit on organizations making interstate acquisi-
tions and a 30 percent statewide limit (unless a
state chooses a different limit).
So far, few of the megamergers within the
United States have posed significant competi-
tive issues under our antitrust guidelines or con-
centrationlimits.Mostofthelargemergershave
been interstate acquisitions in which an organi-
zation expands into new markets, leaving local
marketconcentrationunchanged.Also,forlarge
in-market mergers, the markets have often been
of low or moderate concentration with numer-
ous competitors. In other cases, large organiza-
tions have been able to divest of a portion of
their offices to meet the competitive guidelines.
Althoughatsomepointmegamergerswilllikely
raise antitrust concerns, our current competitive
standards still leave substantial room for further
consolidation in the United States.
The other factors used to judge mergers also
would appear to have only a limited restraining
influence on megamergers. In addressing finan-
cial and managerial considerations and future
prospectsthe safety and soundness criteria for
mergerslarge organizations commonly claim
improved earnings growth as they enter new,
attractive markets. They also emphasize pros-
pects for better diversification of risk as they
expand geographically and begin serving a wider
range of customers. In addition, the organiza-
tions most active in merging and expanding are
likely to be those with the most attractive stock
and whose prospects the financial markets
therefore view most favorably. To satisfy conve-
nience and needs considerations and public ben-
efits, organizations that continue to be active in
the merger business will necessarily have estab-
lished a record of serving their communities.
Consequently, many financial industry mega-
mergers do not appear to raise serious antitrust
issues under traditional U.S. merger guidelines.
In addition, large combinations between banks
and other financial service providerswhich
appear to be our next big merger wavewould
likely receive approval under the traditional
merger guidelines, since the merging firms
focus on a somewhat different range of services.
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criteria differ across countries, the recent merger
trends in Europe and other areas seem to indicate
that considerable scope exists for larger financial
institutions within the context of current regula-
tory parameters.
New policy concerns
Although the new banking and financial con-
glomerates may pass our traditional statutory and
regulatory guidelines, I believe that such combi-
nations require that we refocus our attention on a
long-standing, vexing concern. To the extent that
these institutions become too big to fail and are
perceived as protected by implicit guarantees, the
consequences can be quite serious. Moreover,
under these circumstances our current mix of
marketandregulatorydisciplinemaytendtoshift
further away from market discipline and increas-
ingly toward regulatory discipline resulting, per-
haps, in a less efficient industry.
What is too big to fail?What do we mean
when we say a financial institution is too big to
fail (TBTF)? This term might best be applied to
institutions so large that their activities make up a
significant portion of a countrys payments sys-
tem, credit-granting process, or other key finan-
cial roles. As a result, any substantial disruption
in the institutions operations would likely have a
serious effect on a countrys financial markets,
either preventing the markets from operating
properly or raising questions about their integrity.
The outgrowth of TBTF is that countries extend
protection to large institutions and their custom-
ers not granted to others. This protection, more-
over, can take a variety of forms. Even when
regulators sell a large failing bank, remove its
management, and let stockholders take the full
loss, TBTF would still exist if uninsured deposi-
tors are protected or other groups of creditors or
customers receive favored treatment.
The concept of too big to fail came to promi-
nence in the United States during the banking
problems of the 1980s and early 1990s.
Regulatory steps were taken to protect unin-
sured depositors and, in some cases, other types
ofcreditorsinlargebankfailuresincludingCon-
tinental Illinois, several major banks in Texas,
and the Bank of New England. A number of
concerns were used to rationalize this policy. In
particular, there was some fear that a more general
panic might extend to similar types of banks. In
this event, any deposit losses might severely
harm smaller banks with correspondent accounts,
other business customers, workers due to receive
payroll checks, and a broad range of public and
privateorganizations.Consequently,therecould
be significant effects on the local and regional
economy.
Following these events, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act was
passed to limit future bailouts of uninsured
depositors. The act attempts to restrict the use of
TBTF policies by prohibiting the FDIC from
taking steps to protect uninsured depositors if
that would increase insurance losses. However,
the act contains an exception. TBTF could be
adopted if a bank failure would have serious
adverseeffectsoneconomicconditionsorfinan-
cial stability. Although the laws standards for
making this exception are quite restrictive, I
must also point out that its effect is to give statu-
tory recognition to the concept of TBTF.
While U.S. banking authorities are fully com-
mitted to the 1991 restrictions, how the market
views the possibility of TBTF is still critically
important. If uninsured depositors and other mar-
ket participants believe they will be protected
and therefore fail to exert the desired discipline,
then the risk-return tradeoff within the largest
institutions, over time, will tend to become
unbalanced. Furthermore, it may be more diffi-
cult to discipline uninsured depositors in todays
worldwherebankinginvolvesinstantcommuni-
cations and where solvency and resolution deci-
sions on ever larger, more complex institutions
cannot be made at a moments notice. I might
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suggeststhatTBTFmaybethepolicyofchoicein
crisis situations, particularly when mega institu-
tionsplayalargeroleinacountryseconomyand
financial markets.
Consequences of too big to failWhat are
the some of the consequences of TBTF? One
obvious result is the creation of competitive
inequalities. To the extent that very large banks
are perceived to receive governmental protection
not available to other banks, they will have an
advantage in attracting depositors, other custom-
ers, and investors. This advantage could threaten
the viability of smaller banks and distort the allo-
cation of credit.
A second danger of TBTF is the creation of
additional moral hazard problems beyond those
resulting from the existing deposit insurance sys-
tems. If uninsured depositors and creditors of
large institutions are protected from loss, the
safety net is likely to be extended to a broader
range of financial activities. Market discipline
will be curtailed and prevented from working
through to an appropriate solution, and institu-
tions will have greater risk-taking incentives.
Consequently, to preserve financial stability, reg-
ulationandprudentialsupervisionmayhavetobe
extended to a larger part of the financial system.
Athird danger of TBTF is inefficiency. Making
large banks a protected class of institutions will
leadtoalessefficientfinancialsysteminavariety
of ways. Creditors and investors will not have the
appropriate signals for directing their funds to the
most efficient institutions. In addition, bank man-
agement will not face the full force of market-
placedisciplineandsomaybeunderlesspressure
or delayed pressure to operate efficiently. And as
large institutions take on an expanding range of
activities, these inefficiencies and distortions will
be extended to an increasing portion of the finan-
cial system and overall economy. Are these
inefficiencies a serious problem or just a con-
jecture? I think if we look at the countries that
experienced serious banking problems and were
protective of their major banks, we are made
awareoftheinefficienciesandhowquicklythey
can spill over into the general economy.
III. DEALING WITH MEGAMERGERS:
THE POLICY OPTIONS
Ifmegamergersincreasethepossibilityfinancial
institutions may indeed be too big to fail, what is
the appropriate policy response? It seems to me
there are two approaches. We could attempt to
prevent the formation of mega institutions that
might raise concerns, using either existing or
modified merger guidelines. Alternatively, we
could allow megamergers to occur but alter the
supervisory and regulatory framework to attempt
to mitigate the distortions caused by TBTF.
As I noted earlier, existing merger guidelines are
unable to deal with the TBTF problem because
theycenteronthecompetitiveeffectsofmergers
in local markets. Since many megamergers will
involve market or service extensions, we would
not generally expect to find serious competitive
effects in local markets. Put somewhat differ-
ently, the effects of megamergers and related
concerns of TBTF will surface long before anti-
competitiveeffectsshowuponourradarscreen.
Nor do I feel it is feasible to modify merger
guidelines to reflect TBTF concerns. In general,
Ifailtoseehowwecanestablishasizethreshold
for institutions beyond which TBTF consider-
ations dominate. We clearly want to permit
mergers that enhance efficiency within the
financial system. Mergers we want to prevent
are those with no clear efficiency gains and that
are viable, in part, because of the subsidy result-
ing from the institution becoming too big to fail.
As a practical matter, it would be extremely dif-
ficult for regulators to make these kinds of
judgments and to develop effective merger guide-
lines that incorporate TBTF considerations.
Consequently, I believe we should not focus
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ing the distortions arising from TBTF. One strat-
egycurrentlyreceivingattentionreliesonstepsto
reinforce market discipline. The appeal of this
approach is that, if market discipline can be
increased, excess risk-taking can be controlled
and efficiency increased. Proposals to enhance
market discipline generally rely on increasing the
incentive and ability of the market to monitor
financial institutions. Incentives to monitor can
be enhanced through such mechanisms as the
required use of subordinated debt or private
insurance. The ability of the market to monitor
performance can be improved through greater
disclosure of information.
WhileIcertainlyfavormovinginthisdirection,
I question whether enhanced market discipline
can adequately deal with TBTF. The key issue is
credibility.Proposalsthatrelyonincreasedincen-
tives to monitor risk-taking simply wont be
effective unless market participants are con-
vinced they will not be protected in times of
financial stress and unless they have the power to
quickly alter management practices. Generally
speaking, credibility will depend not only on
currentpolicybutalsoonpastpractices.Unfortu-
nately, as we know from experience, in times of
crisis credibility comes at a high price.
As a result, I believe, reluctantly, that much of
the burden of dealing with megamergers and the
effects of TBTF will inevitably fall to more
traditional forms of regulation and prudential
supervision. Here we have two distinct challenges.
First, as megamergers create linkages between
banks and other financial service providers, how
do we prevent the extension of TBTF beyond the
banking system? Second, where market disci-
pline is to a degree muted, how do we control the
risk-taking activities of those institutions that are
too big to fail?
With regard to the first challenge, the critical
issue is how to contain TBTF, even if we cannot
totally eliminate it. If we cannot limit TBTF, we
risk extending the safety net as megamergers
evolve to combine traditional banking with other
financial and nonfinancial activities. At issue is
whetherwecandevelopanorganizationalstruc-
ture for financial service providers that serves to
contain the effects of troubled institutions per-
ceived to be TBTF.
One form this debate has taken in the United
Statesishowtoinsulatebanksandthepayments
system as affiliated entities take on a broader
range of activities and risks. The essence of the
argumentfocusesonthetrade-offbetweenoper-
ational flexibility and containment of the fallout
from a problem institution. Although this issue
has not been as prominent in Europe because of
the dominant role of universal banks in provid-
ingfinancialservices,itislikelytobecomemore
relevant as banks face increased competition
fromcapitalmarkets.Inmyview,thisisanissue
of fundamental importance, and how the debate
is resolved will impact how the world handles
TBTF in future crises.
Regardless of how this debate comes out, we
still face the challenge of managing the risk-
takingincentivesofinstitutionsthatareTBTF.
If we cannot rely entirely on enhanced market
discipline, much of the burden will fall on
regulation and supervisory oversight. As mega-
mergers produce larger and more complex insti-
tutions, regulators will have to respond to these
changes. There are several efforts under way
includingtheGroupof30activitiesandattempts
to revise the Basle risk-based capital standards
to incorporate more accurate measures of risk
exposure. And, in the United States, we have
taken steps to change the emphasis of bank
examinations toward a better understanding of
an institutions principal risk exposures and an
assessment of its risk management controls and
procedures.
Realistically, however, there are limitations to
the effectiveness of regulation and supervision
in accomplishing these tasks, particularly in
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lation and supervision to control risk-taking
requires a delicate balance between providing
effective oversight without becoming intrusive
and imposing excessive costs on the institution.
In the end, I doubt that we can yet be confident
in our ability to either completely isolate the
effects of the failure of a large institution or to
provide a regulatory and supervisory mechanism
that can eliminate TBTF as a possibility over the
business cycle. With the advent of financial mega-
mergers, TBTF is likely to become even more
prominent as an issue, particularly in times of
financial stress. Thus, while I strongly support
our efforts to improve both market and regulatory
oversight of global institutions, I believe we must
also spend more energy preparing now, in a pub-
lic policy context, to deal with these institutions
and TBTF when the crisis inevitably occurs.
IV.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Let me close with a brief summary and some
finalobservations.Therecentconsolidationtrend
inbankingandfinancialservicesisclearlychang-
ing the financial landscape in many countries.
While the creation of larger institutions holds
out the prospect of gains in the efficient delivery
of financial services, it also raises important
public policy issues. In addition to traditional
antitrustandrelatedissues,financialmegamergers
refocus a difficult and troubling concern. To the
extent that these institutions become too big to
fail, the loss of effective market discipline cre-
atesanenvironmentwheretherisk-returntrade-off
may become unbalanced and where inefficiency
can creep into the system.
Unfortunately, there are no simple solutions to
this problem. Attempts to enhance market disci-
pline, while important, are unlikely to be fully
successful;meaningthatmoreoftheburdenwill
move toward regulation and prudential supervi-
sion. But, unless we can find a way of limiting
the extension of government guarantees, we
risk the inevitable extension of regulation into
an ever-widening part of the financial system.
We would be wise, therefore, to recognize that
TBTF will be an important public policy issue
going forward and as we work to allow the
benefits ofconsolidation, we also work to avoid
sacrificing competitive fairness, efficiency and,
most certainly, financial stability.
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